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THE MISSING AND MISPLACED HISTORY IN SHELBY
COUNTY, ALABAMA V. HOLDER - THROUGH THE
LENS OF THE LOUISIANA EXPERIENCE WITH JIM
CROW AND VOTING RIGHTS IN THE 1890s
M. Isabel Medina*
ABSTRACT
The modern Supreme Court adheres to the principle of facial neutral-
ity and the significance of facial neutrality to equality norms in the context
of race. The Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1898, which restricted
the franchise in a number of race neutral ways and introduced the "Grand-
father Clause," exempting any males entitled to vote on January 1, 1867
and their male descendants over the age of 21 at the date of adoption of the
new Constitution from the new restrictions, is illustrative of the very ra-
cially conscious ways in which southern state legislatures in the post-Re-
construction Era deliberately sought to use neutral rules to thwart equality
for blacks. This paper explores the Louisiana experience and what it sug-
gests about the Court's use of neutrality as a primary principle in guiding
equality norms. It does so by exploring the recent Supreme Court decision
in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder and the majority opinion's use of
history in its analysis, and restoring some of the history leading up to pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in particular, the Louisiana experi-
ence with voting rights in the 1890s, to illustrate the significance of the
historical record in understanding modern day trends and norms.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,' the Supreme Court struck
down the provision in the Voting Rights Act of 19652 that provided the
formula for determining which jurisdictions were required to obtain
preclearance from the Department of Justice before changing their voting
procedures. The Court's opinion rests largely on two principles: (1) the
conclusion that dramatic changes in society since 1965, reflected in voter
turnout and registration rates and in the number of minority candidates
* Ferris Family Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College of
Law. Parts of this essay were presented at the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship 2014
Conference on President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society and Beyond at the University of
Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to MAPOC participants and the participants of the Mississippi
College Law Review Symposium Readdressing the Voting Rights Act: Where is Our Nation after
Shelby County v. Holder? for their insights and comments.
1. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to
1973aa-6 (1965)).
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holding office, rendered use of the formula unconstitutional; (2) the princi-
ple that still, today, the constitutional structure relies primarily on states in
regulating elections-thus, the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, rather
than being seen to flow from the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment,
"employed extraordinary measures," and a "dramatic departure from the
principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty."
3
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a key part of President Johnson's
Great Society reforms designed to prohibit the practices adopted by south-
ern states and in use by some states across the country to deter, suppress,
and discourage the franchise of blacks and other persons of color. The Act
may be enforced through litigation, but as Justice Ginsburg's Shelby dissent
points out, this kind of litigation is after-the-fact, resource-intensive, com-
plex, and expensive,4 and through the Act's preclearance requirements, so
are the provisions at issue in Shelby. The Act was amended in 1975 to
address practices that deterred, suppressed, or hindered the vote of United
States citizens whose primary language was not English.5 The section of
the Act at issue in the case, section 4, provided the factors that determined
which jurisdictions were covered by section 5 of the Act: whether on Nov.
1, 1964, the state or a state's political subdivision had maintained a test or
device restricting registration or the vote (like a literacy test or good moral
character requirement), and whether less than 50 percent of persons of vot-
ing age were registered to vote on Nov. 1, 1964 or had voted in the presi-
dential election of November 1964. This formula rendered Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia covered juris-
dictions and political subdivisions in Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, and North
Carolina covered jurisdictions as well. The coverage formula was ex-
panded in 1970 and 1975, adding Alaska, Texas, and Arizona as fully cov-
ered jurisdictions and numerous subdivisions in a number of states, and
reauthorized and extended the Act for an additional 25 years in 2006.6 The
states that were fully covered jurisdictions in 1965 were still fully covered
jurisdictions at the time of the Shelby litigation.
Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to secure preclearance from
the Department of Justice prior to making any changes in their voting pro-
cedures.7 Jurisdictions may obtain preclearance by proving that the change
does not have the purpose or effect "of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color."8 Shelby County, in Alabama, a covered
jurisdiction since 1965, challenged the constitutionality of current section 4
factors and section 5 of the Act after the Attorney General objected to the
3. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
4. Id. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 203, 206, 89 Stat. 400, 401-02
(1975).
6. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2005).
7. § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 439.
8. Id.
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County's proposed voting changes.9 The district court upheld the Act and
the D.C. Circuit affirmed.' ° Purportedly reviewing the reauthorization of
the Act under a rationality standard,11 the Court nevertheless struck down
section 4, rendering the provisions of section 5 ineffective, at least until
Congress enacts a new formula to determine which jurisdictions are subject
to section 5 requirements.
The Shelby Court's majority opinion deals with history, curiously. At
the outset, the opinion begins with the ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment and it briefly, in one paragraph, describes the failure of "congres-
sional enforcement of the Amendment" in the first century after its
enactment.12 The Court does not discuss or acknowledge the extraordinary
change and dramatic departure from original founding premises that the
Reconstruction Amendments themselves constituted. Instead, the Court
recounts passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, subsequent amend-
ments, and court opinions considering the constitutionality of the Act. The
Court then discusses the Shelby litigation. In Part II of the opinion, when it
turns to the substantive issue, the Court turns to a historical narrative
again, this time, however, focused on federalism principles in particular, as
concerns elections.' 3 Chief Justice Roberts quotes from a 1990s federalism
case, Gregory v. Ashcroft, to the effect that "the Framers of the Constitu-
tion intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections."' 4 The federal government
retains "significant control over federal elections," he acknowledges, but as
an example he returns to the original Constitution, and the provision in
Article I granting Congress power to change the time and manner states
have set for electing senators and representatives, rather than the more
obvious and telling example, the Fifteenth Amendment. In this part of the
opinion, in fact, examining the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and state governments in the context of voting rights, the Court does
not mention or recount the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments at all. The Court's opinion discusses the original Constitu-
tion, in particular the Tenth Amendment, and simply ignores the Civil War
and the Reconstruction Amendments, and how they altered the constitu-
tional landscape on voting and elections. This missing history facilitates the
Court's conclusion that the provisions of the Voting Rights Act "authorizes
federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking" and
represents "an extraordinary departure from the traditional course of rela-
tions between the States and the Federal Government," themes echoed in
9. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.C. 2011). Justice Ginsburg's dissent in
Shelby details the reasons why application of the preclearance requirement to Shelby County, and Ala-
bama in particular, was justified. See Shelby Cnty., Ala., 133 S. Ct. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
11. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622.
12. Id. at 2619.
13. Id. at 2623.
14. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991)).
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previous recent Court decisions.15 At its conclusion, the Court's majority
emphasizes the need for the coverage formula to address "current condi-
tions," presumably, rather than looking to historical discrimination.
Although the Shelby Court's ruling is limited, the opinion, substan-
tively and stylistically, ignores the wave of state legislation imposing more
restrictions on the franchise, ostensibly directed at deterring voter fraud
but impacting, in particular, voters of color, including immigrant citizen
voters and voters of reduced means.16 This paper explores the historical
narrative that followed the enactment of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the understanding of state sovereignty over regulation of
elections currently missing in the Court's majority opinion, through the
Louisiana experience in Reconstruction and the subsequent curtailing of
voting rights during the 1890s and the segregation era.
Louisiana's historical narrative on voting rights reveals the promise
and hope that came out of the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, as
well as the violence and ease with which powered groups who are not nec-
essarily numerical majorities can solidify their grasp of power, and how
readily the law, specifically constitutional law, assists them.
II. LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONS, RACE, AND THE VOTE
Louisiana's first Constitution, adopted in 1812, contained no specific
reference to slavery or race. It set up a system of government mirroring
that set up by the United States Constitution, and although it did not con-
tain a formal bill of rights, it did include specific provisions recognizing
some of the rights protected under the federal Constitution. Suffrage was
extended to all free white male citizens of the United States, at least 21
years of age, who had resided in the territory for one year and paid a tax,17
and most Louisiana constitutions until the Civil War continued to extend
the suffrage to free white male United States citizens who had reached the
age of 21, sometimes extending the period of residency to two years. 18 Al-
though Louisiana's Constitution contained no specific reference to slavery
15. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203, 224 (2009) (quoting Lopez
v. Monterey Cnty., et al., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999); Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 500-
501 (1992)).
16. See Alabama Act No. 2011-673 (2011) (codified at ALA. CODE § 17-9-30 (2011)), available at
http://www.alabamavoterid.com/downloads/2011-673.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2014); Voter Information
Verification Act, S. L. 2013-381, H.B 589 (2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013[Bills/
House/PDF/H589v9.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2014); and An Act Relating to Requirements to Vote,
S.B. 14 Texas (2011), available at http:l/www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82Rbilltext/pdf/SBOOO14F.pdf#
navpanes=0 (Sept. 10, 2014); see also Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm'n, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35696 (Dist. Ct. Kan., Mar. 19, 2014); Fernanda Santos, Two States Win Court Approval on
Voter Rules, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2014, at Al; and Rick Lyman, Texas' Stringent Voter ID Law Makes
a Dent at Polls, N.Y. TIMES, November 6, 2013, at A20.
17. LA. CONST. OF 1812, art. I, § 8, in BENJAMIN WALL DART, LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONS AN-
NOTATED 499 (1932); see LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENrIONS 1812-1921, Louisiana State Law
Institute 17 (1950).
18. LA. CONST. OF 1845, in DART, supra note 17, at 508 (required that voters had to have been a
U.S. citizen for two years and resided in the state for two consecutive years prior to election); LA.
[VOL. 33:201
JIM CROW AND VOTING RIGHTS IN THE 1890S
(like the United States Constitution), Louisiana law had provided for slav-
ery under both French and Spanish rule, and adopted a slave code in 1806
that rendered slaves "real estate," that is property to be sold, mortgaged,
and seized as real estate.19 Although New Orleans and other parts of Loui-
siana witnessed the growth of an educated, propertied, and professional
free black class, that group was not successful in gaining the franchise or
political power, except perhaps indirectly.
20
The Constitution of 1861 implemented Louisiana's ordinance of seces-
sion and amended the 1852 Constitution by substituting the Confederate
States for the United States wherever it appeared.21 It was the first Louisi-
ana Constitution to not be put to a vote of the people. As John Hope
Franklin noted in Reconstruction After the Civil War, New Orleans fell al-
most immediately to Union forces. By August 1862, more than 11,000 ex-
Confederate Louisianians had agreed to take an oath of allegiance to the
Union, placing themselves in a position to send representatives to Congress
by February 9, 1863.22 Louisiana, thus, was the only Confederate state to
have representatives in Congress before the Confederacy collapsed, while
plans for the South's reconstruction began to be debated and formulated.23
One of those representatives, Michael Hahn, was elected governor in Feb-
ruary 1864, while Louisiana was still under military control.
The Constitution of 1864 abolished slavery 24 and authorized the legis-
lature to grant the vote to "such other persons, citizens of the United
States, as by military service, by taxation to support the government, or by
intellectual fitness, may be deemed entitled thereto," but it did not guaran-
tee the franchise to black males, nor did it require the legislature to actually
provide it.25 This Constitution was submitted to the electorate and ratified
in September 1864 with a vote of 6,836 against 1,566. That electorate, how-
ever, did not include blacks. According to Franklin, more than 18,000 free
black property owners resided in New Orleans at the outbreak of the war.
They sought the vote as early as 1862, even appealing directly to President
CONST. OF 1852, in DART, supra note 17, at 523 (changed the requisite time period back of residence to
one year and eliminated the requirement of a certain number of years of U.S. citizenship).
19. THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW 1619-1860 74-77 (1996).
20. See Paul A. Kunkel, Modifications in Louisiana Negro Legal Status Under Louisiana Consti-
tutions 1812-1956, 44 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY 1, 4 (1959); see generally IRA BERLIN, SLAVES
WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974) and LOREN SCHWENINGER,
BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE SOUTH 1790-1915 (1990).
21. LA. CONST. OF 1861 in DART, supra note 17, at 536.
22. JoIHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 15 (1961).
23. Id. at 16.
24. LA. CONST. OF 1864, arts. I-II, in DART, supra note 17, at 537 (abolishing slavery and involun-
tary servitude except as punishment for crime, and restricting the legislative power: the "legislature
shall make no law recognizing the right of property in man").
25. LA. CONST. OF 1864, art. XV, in DART, supra note 17, at 540. In 1865, Louisiana enacted a
Black Code granting some rights to newly freed slaves, but not the right to vote.
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Lincoln.26 But the Constitution of 1864 rejected their plea, and the Louisi-
ana state legislature similarly made no provision for black suffrage.27 Pres-
ident Lincoln died in April 1865, while Congress began consideration of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress refused to recognize the state government established under
the 1864 Constitution. In June 1866, Congress passed the Fourteenth
Amendment vesting citizenship in all persons born in the United States,
and thus, vesting citizenship in blacks. An effort in July 1866 to hold a
constitutional convention in Louisiana to grant suffrage to African Ameri-
cans led to the Riot of 1866 - what one historian called "an absolute massa-
cre" at the Mechanics Institute in New Orleans over the push for the
franchise.28 Louisiana, like other southern states, rejected adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.29 But the next year, in 1867, Louisiana's newly
installed military government called for a new Constitutional Convention.3"
To elect delegates to the Convention, the state was to register adult male
voters without regard to race, and this time the number of black registered
voters vastly outnumbered whites, with 82,907 blacks out of a total of
127,639.31 Despite the substantial majority of black voters, the electorate,
by agreement, elected 98 delegates to the new Convention: 49 white and 49
black.32
In 1868, two years before ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the
state adopted a new Constitution that guaranteed broad "civil, political,
and public rights and privileges, to all persons, without regard to race,
color, or previous condition, born or naturalized in the United States."33
This Constitution began with a well-developed bill of rights, which subse-
quent Louisiana constitutions have continued to enshrine. The number
and quality of rights, however, have been curtailed in subsequent constitu-
tions. Included in its guarantee, through a series of provisions, was the
right to vote - it was granted only to men not to women, but for the first
time in Louisiana every male person 21 years or over, born or naturalized
26. FRANKLIN, supra note 22, at 21. In 1862, Paul Trevigne, a free man of color, began editing
L'Union, a newspaper that pushed for free black suffrage. JAMES G. HOLLANDSWORTH, JR., AN ABSO-
LUTE MASSACRE: THE NEw ORLEANS RACE RIOT OF JULY 30, 1866 10-15 (2001).
27. FRANKLIN, supra note 22, at 25.
28. Id. at 64-65; HOLLANDSWORTH, supra note 26, at 10-15.
29. FRANKLIN, supra note 22, at 67.
30. Id. at 70. Congress' 1867 reconstruction plan divided up the former Confederate states into
five military districts. Louisiana and Texas constituted one district. Congress required ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment and adoption of a state constitution to be approved by Congress in return
for the state's full admission to the Union. Id. at 70-71.
31. Kunkle, supra note 20, at 11.
32. Id.
33. LA. CONST. OF 1868, in DART, supra note 17, at 553. The Constitution of 1868 was the result
of a convention called under the federal reconstruction acts by authority of Special Order No. 166.
Louisiana voters voted in favor of this convention in September 1867. LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS, supra note 17, at 7 n.3. The Constitution itself was approved by Louisiana voters in
1868.
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in the United States and a resident of the state for one year, was guaran-
teed a vote.34 There was a long list of exclusions - most dealing with par-
ticipation in the confederacy, but the presumption was one of universal
suffrage for men.35 Under this Constitution, the number of black voters in
Louisiana increased dramatically. This Constitution also provided for an
integrated, free public school system for all children from the ages of 6 to
21, and guaranteed blacks equal access to public accommodations.
36
The exercise of the franchise for blacks, however, throughout this pe-
riod, continued to be a dangerous practice. Historian Eric Foner referred
to this time period as a "wave of counterrevolutionary terror. '37 Also in
1868, the state saw the establishment of the Knights of the White Camellia,
Louisiana's Ku Klux Klan, subsequently replaced by the White League.38
The Colfax Massacre in 1873 gave witness to the violence which black vot-
ers would encounter in casting their vote, and made it clear, as well, that
law, specifically constitutional law, could insulate that violence from ac-
countability.39 Attempts to prosecute some (over 100) of the perpetrators
of the massacre federally under an act prohibiting persons from interfering
with the franchise resulted in a guilty verdict for three defendants, but was
ultimately set aside by the United States Supreme Court on a technicality
in United States v. Cruikshank in 1875, with the Court noting that "the Con-
stitution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage upon
any one."40 Suffrage was not a constitutional right; it was protected only
"on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."'4 1 The
Court set aside the convictions, finding that the indictments were insuffi-
cient because they failed to specify that the interference with the vote was
on account of race.42 In United States v. Reese, handed down the same year
as Cruikshank, the Court stymied another prosecution under the same stat-
ute, this time finding some of the statute's provisions on voting rights be-
yond Congress' powers under the Fifteenth Amendment because they did
not expressly limit their application to cases involving racial discrimina-
tion.43 The language of the statutory provisions, the Court reasoned, was
34. LA. CONST. OF 1868, arts. 13, 98, in DART, supra note 17, at 554, 563.
35. LA. CONST. OF 1868, art. 98, in DART, supra note 17, at 563.
36. LA. CONST. OF 1868, art. 135, in DART, supra note 17, at 565. Louisiana was one of only two
southern states to provide for an integrated system of public education during Reconstruction. FRANK-
LIN, supra note 22, at 111-12.
37. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 425
(1988).
38. JOE G. TAYLOR, LOUISIANA RECONSTRUCTED 1863-1877 162-63 (1974); TED TUNNELL, CRU-
CIBLE OF RECONSTRUCTION: WAR, RADICALISM AND RACE IN LOUISIANA 1862-1877 153 (1984).
39. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR
(2006).
40. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (the Court found all of the counts al-
leged in the indictments insufficient for a variety of reasons). This paper discusses only the counts that
involved interference with the vote. Some counts, the Court concluded, were simply too vague and
general, and "so defective that no judgment of conviction should be pronounced upon them." Id. at
559. The indictment was based on the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (May 31, 1870). Id. at 544.
41. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555.
42. Id. at 555-56.
43. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1875).
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broad enough to apply to conduct not motivated by racial discrimination,
and, thus, the indictment, although reflecting a case in which it was clear
the conduct involved racial discrimination, could not be sustained.4 Reese
and Cruikshank identified the significance of using neutral rules or lan-
guage in dealing with matters of race. Neutral rules could be used to facili-
tate or insulate racial discrimination or violence from legislative or judicial
reach and sanctions.
Ten years later, the Court rejected a similar argument, when Georgi-
ans convicted of conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten[,] and intimidate"
an African American man from voting in an election, and willfully beating,
bruising, wounding, and maltreating the voter, sought a writ of habeas on
the basis that their indictments were insufficient and that Congress lacked
the power to pass the voter protection laws.4 5 The Yarbrough Court re-
jected arguments that the indictments were insufficient and suggested it "is
a waste of time to seek for specific sources of the power to pass these
laws."46 Nonetheless, the Court looked to the same provisions in the origi-
nal Constitution as the Shelby Court identified, article I, section 4, and de-
scribed the various statutes enacted by Congress pursuant to its power to
"at any time make or alter such [state] regulations. '47 The Yarbrough
Court, however, went on to consider the Fifteenth Amendment:
The Fifteenth Amendment... by its limitation on the power
of the States in the exercise of their right to prescribe the
qualifications of voters in their own elections, and by its lim-
itation of the power of the United States over that subject,
clearly shows that the right of suffrage was considered to be
of supreme importance to the national government, and was
not intended to be left within the exclusive control of the
States.48
The Court went on to caution the threat to a republic stemming from
"the temptations to control these elections by violence and by corrup-
tion . . . a constant source of danger, '49 a caution that seems especially
prescient today in the wake of Shelby and decisions restricting Congress'
power to limit campaign contributions.5"
When the federal government abandoned Reconstruction policies in
1877 under President Rutherford B. Hayes, Louisiana and other southern
states responded by gradually undoing through law the political, economic,
and social gains of blacks after the Civil War and the enactment of the
44. 44. Id. at 221.
45. Ex Parte Yarbrough et al. (The Klu Klux Klan Cases), 110 U.S. 651, 655-56 (1884).
46. Id. at 666.
47. Id. at 660-63.
48. Id. at 664.
49. Id. at 666.
50. See, e.g., McCutcheon et al. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) and Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.51 White supremacists targeted any distinctions that Louisi-
ana culture had drawn between creoles of color and darker-skinned blacks;
by the turn of the century all were targeted. As the state's largest metro-
politan area with a substantial Catholic creole (mixed race) population,
many of whom had provided political leadership during the state's Recon-
struction government, New Orleans was at the center of the battle over the
mechanisms designed to deprive blacks and creoles of political power-
mechanisms that mandated segregation of the races and disenfranchise-
ment of blacks.
In 1879, Louisiana adopted a new Constitution. White women peti-
tioned the Convention working on the new Constitution for the vote.
52
This initial push for the franchise for women did not align itself explicitly
with white supremacy and sought the vote for women on the grounds that
they deserved it and would use it wisely. Nonetheless, the Constitution of
1879 failed to provide women the franchise, but continued to restrain the
power of the legislature to restrict the suffrage "on account of race, color[,]
or previous condition of servitude."53 This Constitution continued to re-
quire free public schools for all children in Louisiana, but added a new
article providing for the establishment in New Orleans of "a university for
the education of persons of color."5 4 Thus began in Louisiana the formal
expectation and establishment of legal segregation. The violence of the
Reconstruction period continued unabated. In 1887 in Thibodaux, south
Louisiana Catholic territory planters and other whites massacred, striking
black sugar plantation workers. Still, in 1888, voter registration lists for
the state listed 128,150 "colored" voters and 125,407 whites.
56
In 1890, Louisiana enacted a statute mandating segregation of the
races in railroad cars, later upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson.5 7 The challenge to the law was mounted in New Orle-
ans by creoles, who traditionally had enjoyed a more privileged status in
New Orleans society than slaves or darker skinned blacks.58 Light-skinned
creoles, many of whom passed for white, including Homer Plessy, strongly
resisted racial segregation and the increasing rigidity of racial castes that
made it more and more difficult for interracial relationships of any kind in
51. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 4-8 (1955); WILLIAM IVY HAIR,
CARNIVAL OF FURY ROBERT CHARLES AND THE NEW ORLEANS RACE RIOT OF 1900 13-14 (1976).
52. Armantine M. Smith, The History of the Women's Suffrage Movement in Louisiana, 62 LA. L.
REV. 509, 514-23 (2002); CARMEN LINDIG, THE PATH FROM THE PARLOR: LOUISIANA WOMEN 1879-
1920 37-40 (1986).
53. Smith, supra note 52, at 522-23; LA. CONST. OF 1879, art. CLXXXVIII, in DART, supra note
17, at 593.
54. LA. CONST. OF 1879, arts. CCXXIV, CCXXXI, in DART, supra note 17, at 599.
55. REBECCA J. ScoTr, DEGREES OF FREEDOM: LOUISIANA AND CUBA AFTER SLAVERY 81-87
(2005); ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1915-
1972 8 (1995).
56. SCOTT, supra note 55, at 85.
57. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
58. SCoTT, supra note 55, at 88-93; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 55, at 15.
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Louisiana. It took over six decades in the twentieth century to restore legal
protections to blacks in the South, but even at its height, blacks and black
community organizations, like the Comite des Citoyens who organized
Plessy's challenge to the railroad car statute, continued to battle Jim Crow.
Those abuses and increasing competition for low-skilled work, largely as a
result of the 1890s depression, domestic migration to the city, and an influx
of immigrants, continued to erupt into racial violence, like the Robert
Charles riot of 1900 in New Orleans.59
Notwithstanding the naked racism of the era and the incidents of racial
violence in the city itself, historians like Adam Fairclough maintain that the
incidence of racial violence, including lynchings, and the overall attitudes
of whites to blacks in Louisiana were "harsh, but not as harsh as in Ala-
bama or Mississippi."6 Fairclough attributed this difference in attitude to
the influence of Catholicism in the southern half of the state, and New
Orleans. According to Fairclough:
Catholicism itself, for all its conformity to the practices of
white supremacy, softened, albeit slightly, the harder edges
of racism. The ameliorative influence of the Catholic
Church was discernible, for example, in the lynching statis-
tics. Between 1889 and 1922, the peak years, the north Lou-
isiana parishes of Caddo, Quachita, and Morehouse, all
overwhelmingly Protestant, witnessed more lynchings than
any other counties in the nation. Over half the lynchings
that occurred in Louisiana between 1900 and 1931 took
place in seven parishes, all of them mainly Protestant, and
all but one in the northern part of the state.61
The majority of Louisiana's black population was rural and resided in
north Louisiana. The city and the state were poor and the populations of
both were overwhelmingly illiterate. Although the constitutions had been
requiring the establishment of public schools throughout the state for both
black and white children since the end of the Civil War, most Louisiana
children lacked access to public education.62
In the 1890s, with a majority of blacks making up the state's popula-
tion (51%), Louisiana set about the task of disenfranchising blacks.63 In
59. HAIR, supra note 51, at 137-38.
60. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 55, at 9.
61. Id.
62. JAMES G. DAUPHINE, A QUESTION OF INHERITANCE: RELIGION, EDUCATION, AND Louisi-
ANA'S CULTURAL BOUNDARY 1880-1940 5, 11, 70-72 (1993). New Orleans adopted compulsory attend-
ance in 1910, and in 1914, the state adopted compulsory attendance for all cities with a population of
25,000 or more. In 1916 the state adopted compulsory attendance for all children from ages 7 to 14. Id.
at 88-89. In 1920, Louisiana had the highest illiteracy race in the country (21.9%) for people 10 years
and older. Id. at 93.
63. VAN WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 84-99; JusT A. NYSTROM, NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE
CIVIL WAR: RACE, POLITICS AND A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 215-216, 236-37 (2010).
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1896, Louisiana voters approved an act calling for a Constitutional Conven-
tion "with power to frame and adopt, without submission to the people, a
new Constitution for the State."'  For the first time since secession, Louisi-
ana voters deprived themselves of the right to vote on the new
Constitution.
Delegates to the convention met at Tulane Hall, on University Place,
in New Orleans on February 8, 1898. The Convention's newly elected pres-
ident, Ernest Benjamin Kruschnitt, made clear the Convention's primary
goal in his opening statements:
We know that this convention has been called together by
the people of the State to eliminate from the electorate the
mass of corrupt and illiterate voters who have during the
last quarter of a century degraded our politics . . . Only a
few years back, it might have been considered impolite to
say what I am now saying, but there are men standing high
to-day in the councils of the nation, who have seen the
doors of the White House barred to them by the ignorant
and corrupt delegations of Southern negroes ... May this
hall, where, thirty-two years ago, the negro first entered
upon the unequal contest for supremacy, and which has
been reddened with his blood, now witness the evolution of
our organic law which will establish the relations between
the races upon an everlasting foundation of right and
justice.65
The goals of the proposed constitutional changes in 1898 were plainly
stated. Kruschnitt claimed they were necessary to "protect the purity of
the ballot box and to perpetuate the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race in
Louisiana. '' 66 Again, women attempted to persuade the conventioners to
give them the suffrage, this time by aligning themselves with the white
supremacy movement; even that, however, failed to persuade a majority in
the convention to grant the suffrage to women.67 Subsequently, the wo-
men's movement in Louisiana became divided between groups who wanted
the suffrage for all women and those who aligned themselves with white
supremacy. Louisiana women did not obtain the vote until passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.68
64. Act 52 of 1896, in LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 17, at 27-29; see
Amasa M. Eaton, The Suffrage Clause in the New Constitution of Louisiana, 13 HARV. L. REV. 279
(1899).
65. Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisi-
ana (Feb. 8, 1898), 9-10 (R.J. Hearsey, Convention Printer 1898), available at https://archive.org/stream/
officialjournal03convgoog#page/nO/mode/lup (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
66. Id. at 381.
67. Smith, supra note 52, at 538-44; LINDIG, supra note 52, at 112-13, 131-38.
68. Smith, supra note 52, at 555-60; LINDIG, supra note 52, at 139-56.
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The Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1898 rewrote the Louisi-
ana Constitution to restrict the franchise in a number of ways, and intro-
duced the "Grandfather Clause," exempting any males entitled to vote on
January 1, 1867, and their male descendants over the age of 21 at the date
of adoption of the new Constitution from the new restrictions. The Con-
vention journal illustrates the very conscious ways in which the state legis-
latures in the post-Reconstruction Era deliberately sought to use neutral
rules to thwart equality for blacks by disenfranchising the majority of black
voters.
The Convention debated a number of measures designed to deprive
blacks of the vote, including a proposal to restrict the suffrage to persons
who were voters on January 1, 1868, before the adoption of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The propo-
sal was rejected because it was plainly inconsistent with the Fifteenth
Amendment, since it would have immediately disenfranchised all black
voters, as none could have been voters on January 1, 1868, and thus was
deemed unconstitutional. Instead, the convention delegates adopted rigor-
ous registration requirements including a two-year residency period, liter-
acy tests and/or property requirements, and a poll tax, but provided a
"grandfather clause" that exempted any males entitled to vote on January
1, 1867, and their male descendants over the age of 21 at the date of adop-
tion of the new Constitution, from the new, burdensome educational or
property qualifications.69 The measure was similar to the previous mea-
sure, and through the working of the exemption, posed a similar conflict
with the mandate of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Nonethe-
less, the measure passed with a strong majority.
A good number of delegates to the Convention, approximately one-
fourth of the delegates, voted against the measure, most expressing con-
cerns about its constitutionality, and many expressing concerns over its mo-
rality and, what they called, its undemocratic nature.7" It is difficult to
ascertain how many objected to the intentional disenfranchisement of
blacks and how many objected because of its effect on poor, illiterate,
white voters and creoles of color, and because its plain language directly
conflicted with the Fifteenth Amendment, and thus was likely to be held
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court. The 1898 Constitu-
tion also expressly mandated segregated public education. Article
CCXLVIII provided that "there shall be free public schools for the white
and colored races ... throughout the State ... "71
The new Constitution was soon challenged in court, and the challenge
ended up before one of the new judges on the Civil District Court of New
69. Official Journal of Proceedings, supra note 65, at 142. The poll tax was maintained until
abolished in 1940 by constitutional amendment. LA. CONST. OF 1921, art. VIII, § 2, in DART, supra
note 17, at 234 (as amended by Act 374 of 1940).
70. See Official Journal of Proceedings, supra note 65, at 45-46, 143-46.
71. LA. CONST. OF 1898, art. CCXLVIII, in DART, supra note 17, at 646.
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Orleans: John St. Paul, one of the delegates at the Convention.72 David J.
Ryanes, a sixty-year old former slave, born in Tennessee but a resident of
Louisiana since 1860 and freed in 1863, filed an action challenging the
grandfather clause, and the property and literacy requirements. Ryanes
had been a registered voter for 30 years; a beneficiary of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1868.13 Through his attorney, Armand Romain, Ryanes al-
leged that the intent and effect of the new constitutional provisions was to
deny him and other Negroes or colored citizens the vote. Ryanes could
read and write only a little-not enough to fill out the registration form
and to demonstrate literacy to the registrar of voters. He did not own
property. And as a former slave and not able to vote in Louisiana until
1867, he could not qualify to vote in Louisiana under the new Constitution.
To prove the impact of the grandfather clause, Romain introduced
voter records for 1896, 1897, and 1900. Those records showed a dramatic
reduction in the number of blacks registered to vote: in 1896 Louisiana
showed 164,088 white registered voters and 130,344 colored; by 1900, Loui-
siana had 125,437 white registered voters and only 5,320 colored voters.
The New Orleans numbers were staggering as well: in 1896 there were
45,907 white registered voters and 14,177 colored; by 1900 white registered
voters had dropped to 37,491 but colored voters had dropped to 1,493. To
prove intent, Romain tried to introduce the Official Journal of the Conven-
tion Proceedings, which proved
that the Constitutional Convention ... was called together
for the purpose principally of disfranchising the colored citi-
zens of this state, and to adopt a plan.., of suffrage qualifi-
cations, by which all white men in the state could . . . be
retained in the Electorate, and all the colored men in the
state, as far as possible should be excluded from the said
Electorate .... 74
The attorneys representing the defendant, the supervisor of voter re-
gistration for the parish of Orleans, objected to the admission of the Jour-
nal on the grounds that it was immaterial and irrelevant, since the language
of the relevant Constitutional provisions was clear, and thus, there was no
need to resort to questions about legislative intent.75 The language of the
Constitution was racially neutral, essentially, since it did not single out
black voters but simply enacted race neutral restrictions and used a particu-
lar date to determine who was to be exempted from the restrictions. Judge
St. John agreed that evidence as to legislative intent was irrelevant and
72. John St. Paul went on to become a Justice on the Louisiana Supreme Court. He was the
founding Dean of the law school at Loyola University New Orleans.
73. ScOTr, supra note 55, at 42-46.
74. Transcript of Hearing at 37-38, State ex rel Ryanes v. Gleason, 36 So. 608 (La. 1904) (No.
14,651) (records housed at the Historical Archives of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Earl K. Long
Library, University of New Orleans).
75. Id.
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refused to consider the evidence. One of the defense attorneys was the
former chair of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1898, E. B.
Kruttschnitt. The suit was filed on April 30, 1902. The case went to trial on
July 28, 1902, and Judge St. Paul issued his decision the same day. Judge St.
Paul ruled that a prior action filed by Mr. Ryanes in the same court but
before a different judge barred reconsideration of the issues since the dis-
missal of the prior suit constituted a ruling on the merits.
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided it lacked jurisdiction
to review the dismissal of the case because the new Constitution did not
specifically provide for appeals when the only question before the court
was one of the alleged invasion of political rights, like the right to vote.76
Mr. Ryanes, a voter for thirty years, like many other black voters, was left
with no recourse.
Other southern states adopted Louisiana's grandfather clause ap-
proach to reduce black suffrage. In 1915, the United States Supreme Court
held that this kind of grandfather clause, plainly adopted to disenfranchise
blacks, violated the Fifteenth Amendment in Guinn v. United States. 77 In
response to the Guinn decision, Louisiana amended its Constitution in
1921 to adopt the "interpretation test" or "understanding clause," which
continued to vest almost complete discretion in the hands of registrars to
determine who would be allowed to register to vote based on a potential
voter's ability to "give a reasonable interpretation" of any clause in the
Louisiana or United States Constitutions.78 This provision was highly ef-
fective at deterring the black franchise. As of 1940, a total of 897 blacks
were registered in Louisiana.79 This provision remained in place until the
United States Supreme Court struck it down in 1965 in Louisiana v. United
States.8 ° Black voters in Louisiana, as across the South, had to wait until
Congress enacted new voter right protections empowering not just private
individuals, but the Department of Justice, to enforce, and the activism of
the Civil Rights Era before their votes counted again.
11. BRINGING THE WALL DOWN8 1
A wall stands in Louisiana between registered voters and
unregistered, eligible Negro voters. The wall is the state
constitutional requirement that an applicant for registration
'understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any sec-
tion' of the Constitutions of Louisiana or of the United
76. Id.
77. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 368 (1915) (Oklahoma's grandfather clause struck
down as invalid).
78. LA. CONST. OF 1921, art. VIII, §1, in DART, supra note 17, at 231; see Kunkel, supra note 20,
at 1-25.
79. Kunkel, supra note 20, at 21.
80. Louisaina v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). Louisiana primarily relied on its white pri-
mary law to disenfranchise black voters until 1944, when the Supreme Court struck down a parallel
Texas primary system in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
81. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963).
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States. It is not the only wall of its kind, but since the Su-
preme Court's demolishment of the white primary, the in-
terpretation test has been the highest, best-guarded, most
effective barrier to Negro voting in Louisiana . . . [T]his
wall, built to bar Negroes from access to the franchise, must
come down. The understanding clause or interpretation test
is not a literacy requirement. It has no rational relation to
measuring the ability of an elector to read and write. It is a
test of an elector's ability to interpret the Louisiana and
United States Constitutions. Considering this law in its his-
torical setting and considering too the actual operation and
inescapable effect of the law, it is evident that the test is a
sophisticated scheme to disfranchise Negroes. The test is un-
constitutional as written and as administered.82
So held the lower court in United States v. Louisiana."3 But it would
be a mistake to think of the decades that preceded the case as a period
where black citizens lay dormant, awaiting the activism of the Civil Rights
Era. Throughout the early decades of the twentieth century in Louisiana,
blacks continued efforts to challenge Jim Crow, segregation, and the re-
strictive practices that effectively denied the majority the franchise.84 In
1944, New Orleans attorney A.P. Tureaud, with the support of Thurgood
Marshall and the NAACP, filed a case in district court challenging the re-
strictions the registrar of St. John the Baptist Parish imposed on blacks
when attempting to register to vote, which included refusing to provide
applications, refusing to meet with them, and asking excessively technical
questions, like to define the meaning of the word "certiorari," a term that
appeared in the Louisiana Constitution in place at the time.85 The district
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the
plaintiffs had not exhausted all possible state remedies.86 On appeal to the
Fifth Circuit with Mitchell v. Wright, a companion case, the Fifth Circuit
reversed both lower courts, explaining its reasoning in the Alabama case8"
and making it clear that jurisdiction to decide the merits of the claims was
proper and plaintiffs did not have to exhaust state judicial remedies prior
to suing in federal court.88
For every effort to give effect to the ability of black voters to exercise
the franchise, there were equally forceful efforts to resist and oppose black
franchise and integration. The same period saw the rise of Citizens Coun-
cils and a concerted effort to purge the rolls of black voters and ensure that
82. Id. at 355-56.
83. Id.
84. RACHEL L. EMANUEL AND ALEXANDER P. TUREAUD, JR., A MORE NOBLE CAUSE: A.P.
TUREAUD AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 110-113 (2011).
85. Id. at 111.
86. Hall v. Nagel, 154 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1946).
87. Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946).
88. Hall, 154 F.2d at 931; Wright, 154 F.2d at 926.
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registrars across Louisiana aggressively enforced the interpretation test.89
But it was as a result of litigation instigated by the Department of Justice
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,90 a precursor to
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that the interpretation/understanding bar-
rier to black suffrage in Louisiana came down. In a series of cases brought
in 1961, the United States successfully challenged racially discriminatory
practices in voter registration throughout Louisiana, culminating in the Su-
preme Court decision in Louisiana v. United States.91
The United States filed suit on October 16, 1961 in the Eastern District
of Louisiana challenging the practices of the registrar of voters in Pla-
quemines Parish as engaging in a pattern and practice of racial discrimina-
tion against black applicants for registration since January 1953.92
Plaquemines Parish was the home of Leander Perez, one of southern Loui-
siana's most well-known white supremacists and segregationists. The ac-
tion, in part, challenged the registration practices established in 1962, after
the "constitutional interpretation" test had been discarded and replaced
with what purported to be an objective test, requiring applicants to answer
six multiple choice questions.93 In defense, the Parish challenged the con-
stitutionality of the federal provisions at issue.94 The district court noted
that the voting age population of Plaquemines Parish in 1960 consisted of
8,633 white and 2,897 non-white persons; yet as of March 12, 1962, the
number of registered voters in the parish consisted of 6,906 white and 43
black persons. 95 The court found insufficient evidence of a pattern and
practice of racial discrimination, but granted an injunction prohibiting the
registrar from engaging in racial discrimination in the registration process
for the parish.96 The court noted apathy on the part of blacks for failing to
register, but made no reference to the violence and hostile atmosphere pro-
spective black voters would likely encounter were they to overcome what
the court considered lethargy.97 Although the court found evidence of past
discriminatory conduct (registrar providing white applicants with answers
89. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 55, at 198-99, 206-08, 220-23, 226-33.
90. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
91. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); see United States v. Manning, 206 F. Supp.
623 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v. Fox, 211 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. La. 1962); United States v. Louisiana,
225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963); see also John Doar, The Work of the Civil Rights Division in Enforc-
ing Voting Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1997).
92. Fox, 211 F. Supp. At 28.
93. Id. at 29, afftd, 334 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1964).
94. Id. at 34.
95. Id. at 29.
96. Id. at 34.
97. Id. at 31; but see Doar, supra note 91, at 5-6 (describing violent resistance to voter registra-
tion efforts).
[VOL. 33:201
JIM CROW AND VOTING RIGHTS IN THE 1890S
to copy, or providing white applicants with easier questions than those pro-
vided to black applicants), the court rejected as a remedy an order requir-
ing immediate registration of all black citizens of voting age in the parish.9
The court also upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute. 99
Later in 1961, in United States v. Louisiana, the federal government
brought suit against the state for its voter registration qualification laws,
including the Louisiana constitutional provisions authorizing the interpre-
tation/understanding requirement.100 The lower court decision described
at length the history of Louisiana's "historic policy and the dominant white
citizens' firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state and local
government by denying to Negroes the right to vote."10 l
IV. KEEPING THE WALL DOWN
The right to vote continues to be of vital importance to the long-term
health of the country as a republic. Particularly in an era when the role of
money in elections appears to be increasingly decisive and scrutiny over
campaign funding effectively restricted, the vote itself appears to remain as
the primary mechanism for the individual voter to have an impact on the
political process. More attention needs to be paid to enhancing the
franchise-facilitating the vote rather than making it more expensive and
difficult for the average citizen to exercise. Moreover, rather than enacting
more restrictive measures that require individual citizens to spend money,
government should work to make it possible for everyone to vote easily,
without the vote being affected by one's ability to negotiate bureaucracies
and resource-intensive regulations. That should be the focus of 21st cen-
tury state and federal legislatures-how to make it easier and cheaper for
all citizens to vote rather than how to erect barriers of time, money, and
place ostensibly designed to deter voter fraud, but sought primarily for po-
litical gain and to deter the vote of the wrong type of citizen. Few citizens
are in a position to contribute thousands, even millions, to candidates for
office. All should be able to vote.
98. Fox, 211 F. Supp. at 31.
99. Id. at 34-35.
100. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963).
101. Id. at 363.
2014]

